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ABSTRACT
Prevailing economic models of consumer behavior completely ignore the well-
documented link between context and evaluation. We propose and test a
theory that explicitly incorporates this link. Changes in one group’s spend-
ing shift the frame of reference that deﬁnes consumption standards for others
just below them on the income scale, giving rise to expenditure cascades.
Our model, a descendant of James Duesenberry’s relative income hypothe-
sis, predicts the observed ways in which individual savings rates respond to
changes in both own and others’ permanent income, as well as numerous other
stylized fact patterns that are diﬃcult to reconcile with prevailing models.
Evaluative judgments are known to depend heavily on context. For example, the
same car that would have been experienced by most drivers as having brisk accel-
eration in 1950 would seem sluggish to most drivers today. Similarly, a house of
given size is more likely to be viewed as adequate the larger it is relative to other
houses in the same local environment. And an eﬀective interview suit is simply one
that compares favorably with those worn by other applicants for the same job.
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Although the link between context and evaluation is uncontroversial among
behavioral scientists, traditional economic models completely ignore it. These
models assume that each person’s consumption spending is completely independent
of the spending of others.
In contrast, James Duesenberry’s relative income hypothesis explicitly acknowl-
edges the link between context and evaluation (Duesenberry, 1949). In this paper we
employ a variant of his model to derive and test the proposition that context shapes
spending patterns. In this eﬀort, we exploit data that allow us to quantify the sub-
stantial increases in local income inequality that have occurred in recent decades.
According to the life-cycle and permanent income hypotheses, these increases should
have no eﬀect on individual spending decisions. In contrast, the relative income
hypothesis predicts a substantial change in spending patterns in response to these
changes. From statistical analysis based on U.S. Census data for the 50 states and
100 most populous counties, we ﬁnd evidence that rapid growth of income among
top earners in recent decades has stimulated a cascade of additional expenditure
by those with lower earnings.
1 Expenditure Cascades
Friedman’s (1957) permanent income hypothesis continues to provide the founda-
tion that underlies modern economic analysis of spending and savings. According
to this model, a family spends a constant proportion of its permanent income,
rich or poor. The model thus predicts that savings rates should be independent of
household income and should remain stable over time.
Both predictions are at odds with experience. It has long been shown, for exam-
ple, that savings rates rise sharply with permanent income in cross-section data.1
Savings rates have also shown substantial variation over time. According to U.S.
Department of Commerce estimates shown in Figure 1, the aggregate personal sav-
ings rate has fallen from an average of roughly 10 percent in the early 1970s to
roughly 5 percent today.
The recent experience of middle-income families also casts doubt on Friedman’s
portrayal of the relationship between household income and spending. In 1980, the
1 For example, see Mayer (1972). Mayer rejects Friedman’s original conjecture that this pattern
is explained by the unresponsiveness of spending to transitory income changes, arguing that
it cannot explain why people in high-income occupations save at higher rates than people in
low-income occupations.
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Figure 1. The personal savings rate in the United States.
median size of a newly constructed house in the United States was approximately
1600 square feet. By 2001, however, the corresponding ﬁgure had grown to over
2100 square feet — more than twice the corresponding growth in median family
earnings (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2003). During the same period,
the median household experienced substantial growth in consumer debt. One in ﬁve
American households currently has zero or negative net worth.
Why is consumption expenditure so much higher than predicted by traditional
economic models? We use the term expenditure cascade to describe a process
whereby increased expenditure by some people leads others just below them on the
income scale to spend more as well, in turn leading others just below the second
group to spend more, and so on. Our expenditure cascade hypothesis is that a
pervasive pattern of growing income inequality in the United States has led to the
observed decline in savings rates.
2 An Illustrative Model
Consider an economy with N consumers arranged in descending order with respect
to their permanent incomes. According to the permanent income hypothesis,
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individual i’s current consumption, Ci, is proportional to his/her permanent
income, Yi:
Ci = kYi, (1)
where k is a parameter unrelated to permanent income level or rank. According to
this model, each consumer’s spending is independent of all income levels other than
his/her own:
dCi/dYj = 0, ∀i = j. (2)
Thus, according to the permanent income hypothesis, changes in the distribution
of income should have no eﬀect on individual spending levels. If someone’s income
does not change, his/her spending will remain the same, even if the income and
spending levels of others change substantially.
In contrast to this baseline model, we consider the following variant of the relative
income hypothesis:
Ci = k(1 − a)Yi + aCi+1, (3)
where Ci and Yi again denote current consumption and permanent income levels
of the ith consumer, and where Ci+1 denotes the current consumption level of the
individual whose permanent income ranks just ahead of i’s own. The parameter k
is deﬁned as before, and the parameter a (where 0 ≤ a ≤ 1) represents the extent to
which each individual’s spending is inﬂuenced by the spending of those with higher
incomes. For a = 0, the spending of others has no inﬂuence at all, and the model
collapses to the permanent income hypothesis. For a = 1, an individual’s spending
level is determined entirely by the spending level of the individual whose income
just outranks his own.
In a crude way, this model captures what are perhaps the two most robust ﬁndings
from the behavioral literature on demonstration eﬀects: (1) the comparisons that
matter most are highly localized in time and space; and (2) people generally look
to others above them on the income scale rather than to those below (Frank, 1985,
Chapter 2).
A more realistic model would allow explicitly for the possibility that a consumer
is also inﬂuenced by others more distant from the individual who ranks just ahead
of him. But even in our simple model, the inﬂuence of such others is captured
indirectly through the implied chain of step-by-step comparisons explicit in the
model. For example, if a given consumer were to spend an additional $100, the
spending levels of the four individuals ranked just below him/her would go up by
100a, 100a2, 100a3, and 100a4 dollars, respectively.
For illustrative purposes, we consider a hypothetical 11-member reference group
with k = 0.8 and a = 0.5. If the highest ranked member in this group consumes
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Figure 2. Income rank and savings rates, initial income distribution.
80 percent of his income, lesser-ranked members will consume according to Equa-
tion (3), which, for the assumed parameter values, simpliﬁes to
Ci = 0.4Yi + 0.5Ci+1, i = 1, . . . , N − 1. (4)
For the initial income distribution shown in the left panel of Figure 2, the cor-
responding savings rates are shown in the right panel. They range from a high of
20 percent for the highest ranked member (the savings rate that we would see for
everyone if the parameter a were equal to zero, as under the permanent income
hypothesis), to a low of 12 percent for the lowest-ranked member. The average sav-
ings rate for the group is 15.6 percent, or 4.4 percentage points lower than it would
have been in the absence of income inequality.
We now alter the initial distribution by increasing the incomes of only the two
highest-ranked members. In the new distribution, the highest-ranked member earns
not 100, but 150; and the second-ranked member earns not 95 but 120. The incomes
of the other members are the same as in the original distribution. As shown in the
right panel of Figure 3, the resulting expenditure cascade lowers the savings rates
of all the remaining members. The median earner, with an income of 75 in both
the cases, saves at a rate of almost 15 percent under the original distribution, but
only 12.3 percent under the new distribution. The savings rate for the group as a
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Figure 3. Income rank and savings rates, new income distribution.
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whole is now only 11.6 percent, a full 4 percentage points lower than it was under
the original distribution.
As our simple model illustrates, an increase in income inequality could give rise
to a reduction in savings rates. In the next section, we examine how the increase
in inequality assumed in our illustration compares with the actual recent growth in
inequality.
3 Changing Patterns of Income Growth
In the United States, income growth from 1945 until the end of 1970s was well
described by the famous picket fence chart shown in Figure 4. Incomes grew at
about the same rate for all income classes during that period, a little under three
percent per year.
That pattern began to change at some point during the 1970s. During the 24-year
period shown in Figure 5, the real purchasing power of people at the bottom income
distribution remained essentially unchanged, and gains throughout the middle of
the income distribution were extremely small. For example, median family earnings
were only 12.6 percent higher at the end of that period than at the beginning.
Income gains for families in the top quintile were substantially larger, and were
larger still for those in the top ﬁve percent. Yet even for these groups, income
growth was not as great as during the earlier period. The later period was thus a
period of both slower growth and much more uneven growth.
Income inequality has also increased in two important ways not portrayed in
Figures 4 and 5. One is that changes in the income-tax structure during the Ronald
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Figure 4. Changes in before-tax household incomes, 1949–1979.
Source: http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/f03.html.
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Figure 5. Changes in before-tax incomes, 1979–2003.
Source: http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/h03ar.html.
Reagan presidency signiﬁcantly shifted real after-tax purchasing power in favor of
those atop the socioeconomic ladder, a change that was reinforced by additional tax
cuts targeted toward high-income families during the ﬁrst term of George W. Bush.
A second change not reﬂected in Figures 2 and 3 is the magnitude of the earnings
gains recorded by those at the very top of the income ladder.
Figure 6 portrays some of the results of these two additional eﬀects. Note that
the bottom 20 percent of earners (net of both tax and transfer payments) gained
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Figure 6. Change in after-tax household income, 1979–2000.
Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, “The New, Deﬁnitive CBO Data on
Income and Tax Trends,” Sept. 23, 2003.
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slightly more ground than in Figure 5, which showed pre-tax incomes (net of transfer
payments). Note also that the gains accruing to the top one percent in Figure 6 are
almost three times as large the corresponding pre-tax gains experienced by the top
ﬁve percent. For people in the middle quintile, however, growth in after-tax incomes
occurred at essentially the same modest pace as growth in pre-tax incomes.
For the present purposes, an important feature of recent experience is that the
aggregate pattern of income changes repeats itself in virtually every income sub-
group. Thus, if we look at the top quintile of the earnings distribution, earnings
growth has been relatively small near the bottom of that group and only slightly
larger in the middle, but much larger among the top one percent. We see the same
pattern again among the top one percent. In this group, the lion’s share of income
gains have accrued to the top tenth of one percent.
Only fragmentary data exist for people that high up in the income distribution.
But a few snapshots are available. For more than 25 years, for example, Business
Week has conducted an annual survey of the earnings of CEOs of the largest U.S.
corporations. In 1980, these executives earned 42 times as much as the average
American worker, a ratio that is larger than the corresponding ratios in countries
like Japan and Germany even today. But by 2001, American CEOs were earning
531 times the average worker’s salary. There is evidence that the gains have been
even more pronounced for those who stand even higher than CEO’s on the income
ladder.2
A similar pattern of inequality growth is observed when we look across occupa-
tions and educational groups. It shows up, for example, among college graduates,
dentists, real estate agents, and high school graduates (Frank and Cook, 1995,
Chapter 5). The upshot is that almost irrespective of the identities of the members
of a person’s personal reference group, income inequality within that group is likely
to have grown sharply in recent decades. Even for the wealthiest reference groups,
for which average incomes have risen most sharply, most members are thus likely to
have seen their incomes decline relative to those of their most prosperous associates.
4 Three Speciﬁc Hypotheses
In its simplest form, the expenditure cascade hypothesis is that increasing income
inequality within any reference groups leads to a reduction in the average savings
2 See, for example, Krugman (2002). As Wolﬀ (2002), has shown, the distribution of household
net worth has also be come more right-skewed in recent decades.
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rate for that group. Our attempts to test this hypothesis are grounded on the
observation that income growth patterns for most population subgroups in the
United States in recent decades are roughly like the one shown for the population
as a whole in Figure 6. Within most groups, people at the top have enjoyed robust
earnings growth, while others have seen their incomes grow much more slowly. Our
claim is that the new context created by higher spending at the top of each group
has caused others within the group to save a smaller proportion of their incomes.
An ideal test of this claim would examine how someone’s spending responds when
other members of his/her personal reference group alter their spending. But because
we cannot identify the speciﬁc persons who constitute any individual’s personal
reference group, we are forced to rely on crude proxies.
We begin by assuming that the amount of income inequality within a person’s
personal reference group varies directly with the amount of inequality in the geo-
graphic area in which that group is embedded. This assumption is more palatable
for narrowly deﬁned geographic categories than for broad ones. Thus, the within-
reference-group level of inequality for an individual will correspond more closely
to the degree of inequality in the city in which he/she lives than to the degree of
inequality in his/her home country. In one version of our study, we employ samples
of persons segregated by state of residence. In another, we employ samples from
the 100 most densely populated counties. Our inequality measures for both sets
of jurisdictions coming from the 1990 and 2000 installments of the United States
Census.
Do people who live in high-inequality jurisdictions in fact save at lower rates than
those who live in low-inequality jurisdictions? Unfortunately, the Census does not
record information that would enable us to construct reliable estimates of house-
hold savings rates by state or county. We are thus forced to examine alternative
restatements of the hypothesis that are amenable to testing with available data.
A more general statement of the hypothesis is that families living in high-
inequality areas will ﬁnd it harder to live within their means than their counterparts
in low-inequality areas. This observation suggests that the expenditure cascades
hypothesis can be tested by examining the relationships between various measures
of ﬁnancial distress and measures of income inequality.
Families respond to ﬁnancial distress in multiple ways, some of which leave clear
footprints in data available from the Census or other sources. Beyond saving at lower
rates, for example, they tend to carry higher levels of consumer debt, which increases
their likelihood of ﬁling for bankruptcy. In addition, families who cannot aﬀord
to carry the mortgage payments for houses in conveniently located neighborhoods
with good schools often respond by moving to cheaper, more remote neighborhoods,
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thus increasing their average commute times. And like other forms of distress,
ﬁnancial distress may increase the likelihood of marriages ending in divorce (and
also suppress the likelihood that those people get re-married), which would mean
that at any one time there will be more people divorced. We have found that for both
state and county data, growth in inequality between 1990 and 2000 is positively
linked with growth in each of these three measures of ﬁnancial distress. But because
the narrower county level data are preferable from the perspective of our theory,
we report only the results of our analyses of those data. Indeed, our decision to
focus on the most populous counties was also driven in part by Thorstein Veblen’s
(2001, p. 66) observation that “Conspicuous consumption claims a relatively larger
portion of the income of the urban than of the rural population . . . [because] the
serviceability of consumption as a means of repute is at its best . . . where the human
contact of the individual is widest and the mobility of the population is greatest.”
5 Empirical Results
In this section, we present the results of empirical studies of the links between
inequality and bankruptcy, between inequality and commute times, and between
inequality and divorce.
We calculated two measures of income inequality in household incomes. The ﬁrst
was the ratio of the 90th percentile household income to 50th percentile household
income (henceforth, the P9050 ratio).3 The second is the Gini coeﬃcient, a number
between 0 and 1 that indicates the level of inequality across the entire income dis-
tribution of an area (henceforth, GINI).4 For present purposes, the Gini coeﬃcient
is the preferred inequality measure, because it is Lorenz consistent5 and accounts
for the real income loss experienced by those in the lower reaches of the income
distribution between 1989 and 1999, the speciﬁc time frame covered by our data. In
3 P9050 ratios for states were calculated using 1-percent microdata samples provided by the
Decennial U.S. Census. The ratios for counties were estimated using income brackets. For 1990,
these brackets came from 1990 Census Summary File 3, tables P80 and P80A. For 2000, see
2000 Census Summary File 3, Tables P52 and P53.
4 We used a program provided by the U.S. Bureau of the Census to calculate Gini coeﬃcients.
5 An inequality measure is Lorenz consistent if and only if it is simultaneously consistent with
the anonymity principle (permutations among people do not matter for inequality judgments),
population principle (cloning the entire population and their incomes does not alter inequality),
relative income principle (only relative, and not absolute, income matters), and Dalton principle
(regressive transfers from poor to rich increase inequality).
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the results we report below, we thus conﬁne our attention to regressions in which
our inequality measure was based on the Gini coeﬃcient.
To control for unobserved heterogeneity across states and counties, we con-
structed our regressions in ﬁrst-diﬀerence form. In our bankruptcy regressions, for
example, the value of the dependent variable for each area was calculated as the
diﬀerence between that area’s bankruptcy ﬁlings in 2000 and the corresponding
number for 1990. Similarly, the area inequality variable we used was the diﬀerence
between its inequality measure in 2000 and the corresponding measure in 1990.6
Because both years were at approximately the same point in the business cycle, we
do not expect this external inﬂuence to bias our results.
Our ﬁrst-diﬀerence regression models thus take the following general form:
∆depi = a + b∆ineqi + c∆xi +∆ui, (5)
where ∆depi = dep2000i −dep1990i, the change in the dependent variable for area i,
∆ineqi = ineq2000i − ineq1990i, the change in the measure of income inequality for
area i (either the P9050 ratio or the Gini coeﬃcient), ∆xi is a vector of the corre-
sponding changes in other possible exogenous inﬂuences on the dependent variable
(with c its vector of response coeﬃcients), and ∆ui is an error term, assumed i.i.d.7
The list of exogenous variables is recorded separately for each regression.
5.1 Bankruptcy
Individuals and married couples may ﬁle for non-business bankruptcy under
Chapters 7, 11, or 13. To assess whether increases in inequality increase the like-
lihood of such ﬁlings, we use the total number of adults (18 years old and above)
ﬁling for non-business bankruptcy under any of these three chapters as the basis
for constructing our dependent variable.8
In addition to changes in the Gini, exogenous variables for our bankruptcy regres-
sions include economic and socio-demographic characteristics measures employed
6 Some Decennial Census data, such as income, are for the year prior to the year of the census.
In order to match income data with ﬁnancial distress, we use non-business bankruptcies for
1989 and 1999. Welfare data used in the divorce regressions are from 1990 and 2000.
7 To test for heteroskedasticity, we used a special form of White’s test that regresses the squared
residuals of the original regression on the predicted values and the squares of the predicted
values. We reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity if the F -test on the two indepen-
dent variables is signiﬁcant. Instead of reporting the results of this test in every regression,
homoskedasticity is assumed unless otherwise stated.
8 All bankruptcy data come from the American Bankruptcy Institute’s website.
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by authors in the bankruptcy literature, all translated into ﬁrst-diﬀerence form
(Hermann, 1966; Summers and Carroll, 1987; Fay et al., 2002; White, 2007). Eco-
nomic factors include the change in the twentieth percentile earner’s nominal income
(∆NomP20),9 the change in the proportion of total households in which both
husband and wife work (∆TwoWorker), and the change in the proportion unem-
ployed (∆Unemploy). Socio-demographic characteristics include the change in aver-
age household size (∆HHSize), the change in the proportion of total population
black (∆Black), the change in the proportion of total population Asian and Paciﬁc
Islander (∆Asian), the change in the proportion of total population ages 18–29
(∆Age1829) and 30–54 (∆Age3054), and the change in the proportion of total
population ages 15 and older divorced (∆Divorce). In addition, since the number
of people ﬁling for bankruptcy in a county is population-sensitive, we include the
change in the total county population aged 18 and above as an independent vari-
able (∆AdultPopulation). Finally, we include the change in population density per
square mile (∆Density). Only the last of these variables, ∆Density, does not appear
in standard bankruptcy studies. We added it to control for the possibility that
it might be correlated with social forces that inﬂuence the likelihood of ﬁling for
bankruptcy.10
At the outset, we had no prior views about what functional form would best
capture the relationship between income inequality and ﬁnancial distress. Simple
linear regressions of the change in non-business bankruptcies on changes in income
inequality revealed a positive, signiﬁcant relationship in both our state and most
populous county samples. But the goodness of ﬁt was generally better in regres-
sions involving changes in the logarithm of the inequality measures. Moreover, this
speciﬁcation is robust across our state and county samples and facilitates easily
interpretable results in terms of elasticities. In Table 1, we report the results for
the ∆lnGini measures for the 100 most populous counties.
9 Lacking price index data at the county level, we were forced to use nominal income. But since
the 1990s was a period of relatively low inﬂation, the change in nominal income for a county
ought to be a good approximation for the corresponding change in real income.
10 We do not expect legislation to skew the results because most bankruptcy law occurs at the
federal level, and there was no major change to federal bankruptcy law over the time period
of our data (the most recent large-scale changes occurred in 1978 and 2005). One notable
exception concerns what property may be considered exempt. Under the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Congress adopted a uniform federal bankruptcy exemption but allowed the states
the option of setting their own exemption levels. By the time our dataset began, all states had
taken this option, though some have allowed ﬁlers the option to choose either the federal or
state exemption level. As noted by Fay et al. (2002), states only rarely change their exemption
levels, and most changes are designed to simply preserve the real values of these levels.
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The coeﬃcient for ∆lnGini suggests that, as hypothesized, changes in income
inequality are positively and signiﬁcantly associated with changes in the number of
non-business bankruptcy ﬁlings in our sample of the 100 most populous counties.
A one percent increase in the Gini coeﬃcient is associated with a 7.39 percent rise
in the number of non-business bankruptcies. This is a remarkably strong eﬀect. For
our sample of the 100 most populous counties, the Gini coeﬃcients increased by
an average of 4.41 percent between 1990 and 2000. Our estimate thus implies that
increased inequality in these counties was associated with a 33 percent increase in
bankruptcy ﬁlings between 1990 and 2000. This estimate seems reasonable given
that, on average, non-business bankruptcies increased 148 percent in our sample.
Note also in Table 1 that changes in the absolute income of the 20th percentile
earner are negatively and signiﬁcantly associated with changes in bankruptcy ﬁlings.
This ﬁnding is consistent with the traditional view that families with more money
should be better able to meet their ﬁnancial obligations. But the eﬀect is small,
Table 1. The relationship between inequality and non-business bankruptcy.
Dependent variable: Change in the natural logarithm of the number of
non-business bankruptcies.
Sample: 100 most populous counties.
Independent variable Coeﬃcient Standard error T -statistic P
Constant 0.307 0.206 1.49 0.140
∆lnGini 7.391 2.256 3.28 0.002
∆NomP20 −8.02e−5 2.46e−5 −3.26 0.002
∆Density 4.26e−5 2.57e−5 1.66 0.101
∆lnAdultPopulation 1.185 0.447 2.65 0.010
∆Black −2.102 1.506 −1.40 0.166
∆Asian −1.545 2.682 −0.58 0.566
∆TwoWorker 0.083 3.107 0.03 0.979
∆Unemploy 1.714 3.549 0.48 0.630
∆Age1829 −7.318 3.454 −2.12 0.037
∆Age3054 10.633 6.150 1.73 0.087
∆Divorce 3.839 8.294 0.46 0.645
∆HHSize −1.492 0.747 −2.00 0.049
R2 = 0.5206, Adj R2 = 0.4545
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and does not rule out the notion that a family’s desired consumption may increase
hand in hand with income. Although the ∆Density variable is not statistically
signiﬁcant at conventional levels, this may reﬂect the existence of threshold eﬀects,
since density is extremely high in most of the 100 most populous counties.
5.2 Divorce
The dependent variable in our divorce regressions is the change in the proportion
of the total area population aged 15 and above that is currently divorced. In these
regressions, too, we include the standard economic and socio-demographic factors
discussed by other authors in the relevant literature (e.g., Friedberg, 1998; Steven-
son and Wolfers, 2006, 2007).11 The main economic factor is the change in the
log of the maximum state welfare beneﬁt for a family of three, which captures the
impact of the 1996 welfare reform that gave states greater latitude in distributing
welfare beneﬁts (∆LNWelfare). The socio-demographic factors include the change
in the proportion of total population aged 25 and above with at least a bache-
lor’s degree (∆Edu), the change in the proportion of women aged 16 and above
in the labor force (∆WomenLF), the change in the proportion of total households
receiving retirement income (∆Retinc), the change in the average household size
(∆HHSize), the change in the proportion of total population black (∆Black), the
change in the proportion of total population Asian and Paciﬁc Islander (∆Asian),
and the change in the age distribution (captured by ∆Age1829 and ∆Age3054).12
Again our ﬁndings for the state and county regressions were broadly similar,
with generally better goodness of ﬁt for the county regressions. Table 2 reports our
results for the ∆lnGini speciﬁcation for the 100 most populous counties.
11 To be sure, much of this literature seeks to explain changes in the divorce rate, which is not the
same as the proportion of people that are currently divorced at one time. With that in mind,
we have sought in our models to account for some of the major economic and sociodemographic
characteristics associated with people’s likelihood of getting married in the ﬁrst place and/or
getting re-married after having been divorced (see Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007 for a summary).
The data set we are using only includes current marital status, and not marital history.
12 The two age variables capture two separate factors: people are marrying later (and clearly
marriage is a prerequisite for divorce) and people who are older are more likely to be divorced
at any one time (because they have actually been married in the ﬁrst place). People who are
55 years old and older is our omitted category. Separately, we do not expect diﬀerences in state
divorce legislation to skew these results, as the largest change in divorce laws in recent times —
the adoption of unilateral divorce and no-fault divorce — occurred prior to the start of our
data set. The bulk of these changes occurred in the 1970s, which means that they had been in
place for over one decade by the time our data set began.
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Table 2. The relationship between inequality and proportion currently divorced.
Dependent variable: Change in the natural logarithm of the proportion of total
population aged 15 and above currently divorced.
Sample: 100 most populous U.S. counties.
Independent variable Coeﬃcient Standard error T -statistic P
Constant 0.003 0.022 0.12 0.906
∆lnGini 0.493 0.287 1.72 0.089
∆lnWelfare 0.064 0.057 1.13 0.263
∆Edu −0.914 0.284 −3.22 0.002
∆WomenLF 0.806 0.366 2.20 0.030
∆Retinc 1.616 0.756 2.14 0.035
∆HHSize −0.409 0.091 −4.47 0.000
∆Age1829 −1.042 0.499 −2.09 0.040
∆Age3054 3.156 0.901 3.50 0.001
∆Black 0.175 0.195 0.90 0.372
∆Asian 0.109 0.353 0.31 0.758
R2 = 0.6966, Adj R2 = 0.6625
Note in Table 2 that a one percent rise in the Gini coeﬃcient is associated with
a 0.49 percent increase in the proportion of divorced persons in highly populated
counties. Given that the average change in the Gini coeﬃcient between 1990 and
2000 was 4.41 percent for counties in our sample, the estimate implies that increased
inequality was associated with a 2.16 percent increase in the number of divorces
during this period.
5.3 Travel Time to Work
In these regressions, our dependent variable is the change in the proportion of all
workers aged 16 and over whose daily commute is one hour or more. Here again
we include a variety of economic and demographic characteristics that are known
to aﬀect travel time to work (e.g., Khattak et al., 2000; Levinson and Kumar,
2006). We include changes in nominal median income to capture changes in the
general state of the area economy (∆NomP50). Because of studies ﬁnding a positive
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relationship between race and commute time, particularly for African-Americans,13
we control for racial characteristics by including the change in the proportion of
total population white (∆White) and the change in the proportion of total popu-
lation black (∆Black). We also include the change in the density of the population
(∆Density), this time to control for changes in congestion on the roads and in the
public transit systems. Finally, we include the change in the proportion of total
population receiving retirement income (∆Retinc), to control for the portion of the
population that is probably not commuting.
Again the results for the state and county regressions were broadly similar. Unlike
the earlier regressions, however, we found that ∆Gini provided a somewhat tighter
ﬁt than ∆lnGini in these regressions and was more robust across our state and
county samples. Table 3 reports our results for that speciﬁcation for the 100 most
populous counties.
The estimated coeﬃcient for ∆Gini suggests that, as hypothesized, increases
in income inequality are positively associated with changes in ﬁnancial distress,
as manifested in this instance by decisions to buy cheaper, but less conveniently
located, housing. For counties in our sample, the Gini coeﬃcient went up by an
Table 3. The relationship between inequality and proportion having a long
commute.
Dependent variable: Change in the proportion of total workers aged 16 and above
with one hour or longer daily commute.
Sample: 100 most populous counties.
Independent variable Coeﬃcient Standard error T -statistic P
Constant −2.84e−3 5.62e−3 −0.51 0.615
∆Gini 0.392 0.153 2.56 0.012
∆NomP50 9.93e−7 3.61e−7 2.75 0.007
∆White −0.056 0.047 −1.19 0.237
∆Black 0.158 0.063 2.49 0.014
∆Density −1.19e−7 9.68e−7 −0.12 0.902
∆Retinc −0.351 0.164 −2.14 0.035
R2 = 0.2688, Adj R2 = 0.2217
13 Ibid.
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average of 0.018 between 1990 and 2000. Our estimate thus implies that increased
inequality is on average associated with an increase of 0.0071 in the proportion of
adults with commutes longer than one hour, which (for example) would translate
to over 7000 people in a county with one million workers aged 16 and above.
6 Discussion
The simple expenditure cascade mechanism just illustrated is also consistent with
international savings rate comparisons patterns that are not predicted by the per-
manent income hypothesis. The aggregate savings rate, for example, was lower in
the United States than in Europe in 1980, and the gap has grown larger during
the ensuing years. That pattern mirrors the corresponding cross-national pattern
in the inequality data. Income inequality was higher in the United States than in
Europe in 1980, and the gap is wider today than it was then.
The expenditure cascade model is also consistent with detailed patterns in cross
section data that are not predicted by the permanent income hypothesis. For
example, as James Duesenberry observed in his 1949 book, a black family with a
given absolute income would have higher relative income in the segregated neigh-
borhoods of his era than a white family with the same absolute income. And as
Duesenberry predicted, the savings rates of black families with a given income level
were higher than those of white families with the same income. The permanent
income hypothesis and the life cycle hypothesis, both of which disavow any role for
context in consumption decisions, predict that families will save at the same rate
irrespective of race.
Do expenditure cascades imply irrational consumers? Some economists object
that concerns about relative consumption can aﬀect savings rates in the manner
described only if consumers are myopic. After all, if a consumer is induced to spend
more today because of higher current spending by others, he/she will have even
lower relative consumption in the future. Perhaps so. But it may still be rational
to be responsive to community consumption standards.
Consider, for example, the fact that in most communities, the median family
on the earnings scale now pays much more for housing, in real terms, than its
counterpart in 1980. This family would ﬁnd it easier to live within its means if it
simply spent less on housing than others in the same income bracket. But because
the quality of public schools in the United States is closely linked to local property
taxes, which in turn depend on local real estate prices, this family would then end
72 Frank et al.
up having to send its children to below-average schools.14 In the same vein, a job
seeker could live more comfortably for the time being by refusing to match the
increased expenditures of others on interview suits. Yet doing so would entail a
reduced likelihood of landing the best job for which he was qualiﬁed. It is thus by
no means clear that being inﬂuenced by community consumption standards implies
myopia.
On the other hand, there is considerable evidence that myopia is a salient feature
of human psychology (Pigou, 1929; Ainslie, 1992; Laibson, 1998; O’Donoghue and
Rabin, 1999). The pain of enduring lower relative living standards today can be
experienced directly. In contrast, the pain of enduring lower relative standards in
the future can only be imagined. In the end, ﬁrst principles cannot answer the
question of whether higher spending by some people induces others to spend more.
We must answer this question empirically.
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